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Abstract
This article brings a historical perspective to explain the recent dissemination of
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) as the new Bgold standard^ method to assess
international development projects. Although the buzz around RCT evaluations dates
from the 2000s, we show that what we are witnessing now is a second wave of RCTs,
while a first wave began in the 1960s and ended by the early 1980s. Drawing on
content analysis of 123 RCTs, participant observation, and secondary sources, we
compare the two waves in terms of the participants in the network of expertise required
to carry out field experiments and the characteristics of the projects evaluated. The
comparison demonstrates that researchers in the second wave were better positioned to
navigate the political difficulties caused by randomization. We explain the differences
in the expertise network and in the type of projects as the result of concurrent
transformations in the fields of development aid and the economics profession. We
draw on Andrew Abbott’s concept of Bhinges,^ as well as on Bourdieu’s concept of
Bhomology^ between fields, to argue that the similar positions and parallel struggles
conducted by two groups of actors in the two fields served as the basis for a cross-field
alliance, in which RCTs could function as a Bhinge^ linking together the two fields.
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Randomistas
Few things have shaped development economics and policy evaluation as much as the
turn to randomized controlled trials (RCTs) over the past two decades. Initially
restricted to a handful of researchers, the number of RCT evaluations has grown
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exponentially over the past years. As can be seen in Fig. 1, when the Abdul Latif
Jameel Poverty Action Lab at MIT (J-PAL) was founded in 2003, it consisted of 4
affiliated Professors and conducted 33 projects. By 2017, there were 161 affiliated
Professors and they were involved in 902 evaluations in 72 countries. The honors
bestowed on J-PAL affiliates, also known as randomistas (Deaton 2006), testify to the
prominence of RCTs: since 2003, they were the recipients of five John Bates Clark
Medals and three McArthur Bgenius^ awards, and have commanded considerable
attention from the media and foundations. As the charismatic co-leader of J-PAL,
Esther Duflo puts it: B[RCTs] became this brand.… It became a thing—in academia
and outside organizations^ (quoted in Parker 2010).
Similar to medical trials, RCT evaluations in development economics attempt to
measure the impact of different projects on their participants by comparing them with a
randomly selected no-treatment control group. A 2006 malaria prevention experiment
(Cohen and Dupas 2010) can serve as an illustration. The question was whether to
distribute bed nets for free or to require a small co-payment by recipients. The
researchers selected 5 health clinics in rural Kenya to distribute bed nets for free, 11
other clinics distributed the bed nets for varying small fees, while 4 additional clinics
did not distribute bed nets at all. After 3 months, researchers compared the control and
treatment groups in terms of demand for bed nets and actual use. They found that
charging even a small price reduced demand considerably, while receiving bed nets for
free increased usage. This finding led to a policy prescription of providing bed nets for
free. Experiments like this are now performed in multiple international development
policy areas.
What could explain the rise of RCTs in international development? Randomistas
tend to present it as due to the intrinsic merits of their method, its ability to produce
Bhard^ evidence as compared with the Bsofter^ evidence provided by case studies or
Source: J-PAL (2018)
Fig. 1 J-PAL annual growth (2003–2017)
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regressions (Banerjee and Duflo 2011; Glennerster and Takavarasha 2013). They
compare development RCTs to clinical trials in medicine, implying that their success
is due to the same Bgold standard^ status in the hierarchy of evidence: BIt’s not the
Middle Ages anymore, it’s the 21st century… RCTs have revolutionized medicine by
allowing us to distinguish between drugs that work and drugs that don’t work. And you
can do the same randomized controlled trial for social policy^ (Duflo 2010).
This explanation does not pass muster and need not detain us for very long.
Econometricians have convincingly challenged the claim that RCTs produce better,
Bharder^ evidence than other methods (Rodrik 2008; Deaton and Cartwright 2016).
Their skepticism is amply supported by evidence that medical RCTs suffer from
numerous methodological shortcomings (Demortain 2011, pp. 53–57), and that polit-
ical considerations played a key role in their adoption (Carpenter 2010; Marks 1997).
These objections accord with the basic insight of science studies, namely, that the
success of innovations cannot be explained by their prima facie superiority over others,
because in the early phases of adoption such superiority is not yet evident. It is only
evident in retrospect, thus representing a version of the retrospective fallacy. To explain
success, argue science studies scholars, one has to examine the rhetorical and political
strategies by which champions of these innovations recruit allies and convince audi-
ences of said superiority (Latour 1987; Pinch and Bijker 1984; Barnes et al. 1996).
The few social scientists who attempted to explain the recent spread of development
RCTs have generally followed this insight. They explain the success of RCTs as due to
the Brhetorical … and organizational strategies^ employed by the randomistas to
problematize development knowledge, to offer BRCTs as a means to reduce
uncertainty^ and to transform contested development questions into seemingly technical
problems (Berndt 2015; Donovan 2018, p. 29; Pritchett in Ogden 2016). The agency of
this Bthought collective^ is the key explanatory mechanism in these accounts (Don-
ovan 2018, pp. 34–36; Pritchett in Ogden 2016, pp. 139–142).
While it represents an advance over the self-congratulatory accounts of the
randomistas, we think that this account is incomplete and ill-specified. Methodologi-
cally, it lacks a means of testing the hypothesis and evaluating the significance of
different causal factors. Theoretically, it fails to recognize that the key problem is to
explain the creation of an enduring link between fields. It fails to appreciate the
resistance faced by those who attempt to build this link. And it puts too much of the
explanatory burden on the foresight and interested strategizing of the actors.
In what follows, we use the comparative method to derive and test a more complete
explanation for the success and spread of development RCTs. While the buzz around
RCTs certainly dates from the 2000s, the assumption—implicit in both the randomistas’
and their critics’ accounts—that the experimental approach is new to the field of
international development—is wrong. In reality, we are witnessing now a second wave
of RCTs in international development, while a first wave of experiments in family
planning, public health, and education in developing countries began in the 1960s and
ended by the early 1980s. In between the two periods, development programs were
evaluated by other means (USAID 2009, p. 16). We treat the sequence of first and second
waves as cases of Breiterated problem-solving^ (Haydu 1998): Instead of asking, Bwhy
are RCTs increasing now?^ we ask, Bwhy didn’t RCTs spread to the same extent in the
1970s, and why were they discontinued?^ In other words, how we explain the success of
the second wave must be consistent with how we explain the failure of the first.
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The comparison demonstrates that the recent widespread adoption of RCTs is not
due to their inherent technical merits nor to rhetorical and organizational strategies.
Instead, it reflects the ability of actors in the second wave to overcome the political
resistance to randomized assignment, which has bedeviled the first wave, and to forge
an enduring link between the fields of development aid and academic economics. To
advance this argument, the first section of this article develops a theoretical framework
that combines Abbott’s (2005) concept of Bhinge^ with Bourdieu’s concept of homol-
ogies to account for how fields become durably linked. It is followed by a brief
presentation of our data and methods. The third section compares the two waves of
RCTs as Bhinges,^ and shows that the political resistance to randomized assignment is
much less significant for the second wave because researchers are answerable to a
different audience from that in the past. Resistance is less significant also because
second wave RCTs typically evaluate interventions that are much shorter and smaller in
scale than in the past. The fourth section demonstrates that these differences stem from
homologous transformations in the fields of development aid and academic economics.
These transformations created the conditions for an alliance, across field boundaries,
between economists and the leaders of private foundations. The fifth section details the
elective affinities that facilitated this alliance. In conclusion, we summarize our findings
and underscore the contribution of the article to research on how fields become durably
connected.
The theoretical framework: RCTs as a hinge between fields
The problem common to both the first and second waves of RCTs was how to turn
foreign aid into a Bscience^ of development. Since foreign aid is about the allocation of
scarce resources, the decisions of donors and policy-makers need to be legitimized. One
way of doing so is by recruiting academic experts, whose advice serves to defuse
criticisms and legitimate decisions as efficacious and rational. For their part, academics
also stand to gain from such recruitment in the form of political influence and material
resources. Yet, interests alone are not enough to bring the two together and forge this
science of development. The advice offered by academic experts could easily be
criticized as subjective, biased, and detached from real-world considerations, while
policy-related research is often viewed as below disciplinary standards.
This problem is a sub-species of a more general sociological question about how
distinct fields become durably connected to one another, despite the fact that they are
governed by conflicting logics. This question is at the core of any sociological
investigation of policy-oriented forms of expertise, as institutionalized, for example,
in think tanks or the research departments of global financial institutions (Medevtz
2012; Babb 2009). Given that the academic field is governed by a distinct logic and set
of incentives, to create a durable link connecting it with the field of development aid—a
field governed by more practical and often political considerations—is to take on a
delicate and precarious task that can only happen under specific conditions
(Murray 2010).
This challenge can help explain the preference for RCTs in both waves. As a form of
Bmechanical objectivity … based completely on explicit rules,^ rather than expert
judgment (Porter 1995, pp. 6–8), RCTs are calculated to put to rest suspicions of
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subjectivity and bias, while also appearing to adhere to the highest standards of
disciplinary rigor. They seem, therefore, to be able to bridge between the conflicting
logics and demands of the development aid and academic fields. As J-PAL’s co-leader,
Abhijit Banerjee (2007, pp. 115–116) says, Bthe beauty of randomized evaluations is
that the results are what they are: we compare the outcome in the treatment with the
outcome in the control group, see whether they are different, and if so by how much.^
By saying that the results are Bwhat they are,^ Banerjee means that they are objective,
unbiased, independent of any subjective assumptions, and therefore academically
rigorous and trustworthy, as well as legitimate from the point of view of actors in the
field of development aid.
If considered merely as a rhetorical strategy, mechanical objectivity should have
worked similarly for both waves. To explain why it ultimately failed in the first wave
but is now successful in the second, we need a different way of thinking about how
fields become durably connected. As originally articulated by Bourdieu (1975, 1977),
however, field theory is mostly silent on this question, because of its near equation of
Bfieldness^ with autonomy and hence distinctness (Eyal 2013). The recent interest in
interstitial fields can be seen as a response to this myopia and is a welcome start
(Medevtz 2012; Stampnitzky 2013; Panofsky 2011). A more direct approach, however,
is offered by Abbott’s (2005) concept of Bhinge.^ Abbott suggests that ecologies or
fields1 can become linked to one another through the construction of Bhinges,^ by
which he means Bissues that provide … dual rewards,^ competitive Bstrategies that
work well in one ecology as in the other,^ thus enabling an alliance among actors
across boundaries (ibid., p. 255).
The hinge metaphor is valuable for our purposes because it stresses that, for separate
fields to become linked, a mechanism needs to be built. A rhetorical strategy would not
suffice. A hinge is a device with different parts that must Bhang together^ for the
mechanism to work. We suggest to think about it as an expertise network that connects
actors across field boundaries in order to accomplish a task (Eyal 2013). For the hinge
to enable the simultaneous pursuit of dual rewards in two different fields, one would
need to overcome resistance created by the tension between the incommensurable
logics of the fields. In this way, the concept of Bhinge^ gives us purchase over the
empirical problem of why RCTs were discontinued in the first wave, though they are
successful now.
For RCTs to work as a hinge, there must be randomized assignment to treatment and
control groups. This is how potential biases are removed; how the results are certified
as rigorous according to disciplinary standards; and how the policy statements pro-
duced by RCTs inspire trust among donors and decision-makers. Yet, there is nothing
simple or straightforward about randomized assignment to a no-intervention control
group, as is demonstrated, for example, by the contentious history of medical clinical
trials (Carpenter 2010). Because development interventions usually involve a form of
social assistance, any attempt to assign people randomly to a Bno-intervention^ control
group incurs strong political resistance from participants, the implementing
1 Since Abbott (1988, p. 343) himself suggested that his concept of Btask area^ is similar to Bourdieu’s
Bfield,^ and since the distinction between Becologies^ and Btask areas^ is immaterial for our purposes, we use
Becology^ and Bfield^ here interchangeably. We follow Mudge and Vauchez (2012) in incorporating Abbott’s
concepts into field analysis and treating the two approaches as compatible and complementary.
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bureaucracy, and politicians. How does one get people to participate in such an exercise
of their own accord, without certainty that they would get something out of it?
As Gueron (2017, p. 5) says, this makes RCTs an especially Btough sell^: Bwhy
would any politician or administrator chance adverse publicity, a potential lawsuit,
bureaucratic backlash, or even staff revolt?^ Even when randomized assignment does
take place, legal mandates to provide assistance can exacerbate all the known problems
of Bsubstitution bias^—i.e., the possibility that individuals in the control group are
participating in other available policy options (Heckman et al. 2000). The attempt to
implement RCTs in international development, therefore, could succeed only under
very special conditions, and it requires Bpolitical skills and savvy^ (Gueron 2017, p. 5).
The tension between the differing logics of the academic field—in which the RCT is an
Bintervention^ being evaluated—and the field of development aid—in which it could
be construed as the provision of Bassistance^ to some but not to others (Rayzberg
2019)—make it exceedingly difficult to build a functioning hinge.
This point is ignored by most other attempts to explain the rise of RCTs, with the
exception of Rayzberg’s (2019) insightful analysis. A comparison between the two
waves of RCTs is perfectly suited, however, to highlight its significance and develop its
implications. In the third section of this article, we show that differences in the
composition of the network of expertise required to carry out RCTs, and in the
characteristics of the projects evaluated, largely explain why RCTs were not able to
function as a hinge in the first wave and why they were discontinued—because the
political resistance to randomized assignment outweighed its advantages. This was
because donors and decision-makers in the first wave tended to be governmental
agencies and thus politically exposed; and because first wave RCTs typically evaluated
long-term, broad social policy programs with significant consequences in terms of
health, education, and material inequality. Consequently, political resistance to random-
ized assignment was much stronger in the first wave. In contrast, the composition of the
expertise network in the second wave—especially the role played by philanthro-
capitalists2 and global NGOs—renders it far more insulated from political pressures,
as well as better endowed with resources and more tightly controlled. Similarly, RCTs
in the second wave are typically smaller, of shorter duration, and they evaluate well-
bounded Binterventions^ that are less consequential in terms of allocating of scarce
resources. Consequently, they are able to function as a hinge linking the academic and
development aid fields.
Abbott’s approach, however, is limited when it comes to the question of why and
how hinges emerge. Given the tensions between the two fields, it is not obvious why
actors would be motivated to try to build a hinge. Abbott (2005, p. 255) pays little
attention to this question, saying only that Bsynchronic and diachronic patterns within
and between ecologies create possibilities for alliances between actors and locations
across the borders of ecologies.^ In effect, Abbott must be seen as saying that hinges
emerge 1) when internal dynamics in both fields change in tandem; 2) to create
objective possibilities for alliance across boundaries; 3) and to foster a shared
2 The term Bphilanthro-capitalists^ has been coined by Bishop and Green (2009) to describe new, large
foundations, established by successful individuals from the worlds of finance and technology, who Bapply
business techniques and ways of thinking about their philanthropy^ (ibid., p. 6). The often-cited example is the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (created in 2000), though the term captures a broader movement in the
philanthropy sector (Reckhow 2013).
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perception of these possibilities. The explanatory burden is high. The imputation of
interests, even together with the identification of changing conditions of possibility,
does not suffice if one cannot also account for how actors’ perceptions of these interests
and conditions change and become aligned. This is something for which Bourdieu’s
(1977) praxeological approach, his concepts of Bhomologies^ and Bstrategy without a
strategist,^ is much better suited (Wacquant 1992, p. 25). In this approach, the
successful construction of hinges is not the result of consciously formulated strategy,
but of predispositions and perceptual schemas that are shared across boundaries
because they were formed in the course of conducting parallel struggles in homologous
fields. Actors’ perceptions of their interests are refracted and shaped by the relational
structure of oppositions in their field, while the homology between these relational
structures works to create Belective affinities^ across boundaries and bring them closer
together.
The fourth and fifth sections of this article, therefore, supplement the concept of
Bhinge^ with an analysis of the homologies between fields and the elective affinities to
which they give rise. The fourth section traces the transformations in the fields of
development aid and academic economics, to demonstrate how second wave RCTs
became the Bhinge^ linking them. As the field of development aid fragmented with the
end of Bthe Washington Consensus^ (Rodrik 2006; Babb and Chorev 2016), RCTs
served newcomers like the philanthro-capitalists to challenge the managerial style of
the older foundations (e.g. Rockefeller, Ford) and governments, who relied on expert
judgment. As the field of the economics profession was disrupted by struggles over
causal identification, RCTs offered young development economists a means of
shielding themselves from the anomic effects of these struggles, while challenging
the leadership of the field over its reliance on Bpriors.^ Thus, what led to the alliance
between these two groups was not any rhetorical strategy or rational appraisal of their
shared interests, but the fact that they were both relative newcomers conducting
homologous struggles against the established orthodoxies of their fields at a moment
of relative disorganization.
While others have also attributed the emergence of second wave RCTs to transfor-
mations in the fields of economics and development aid (Donovan 2018; Pritchett
2016), our comparative framework allows us to isolate the latter as the decisive,
necessary (though not sufficient) condition. In both waves there were social scientists
trying to conduct RCTs, but only in the second wave was there an ecology hospitable to
their efforts. The key difference between the two waves is the fragmentation of
development aid, the fact that the field is no longer dominated by Official Direct
Assistance (ODA) between governments. As long as the most significant audiences
for RCTs were the leaders of state and semi-state agencies, as well as politicians and
bureaucrats in developing countries, their embrace of the technocratic consensus of the
day and their political exposure spelled a much weaker interest in RCTs and a tendency
to revert back to reliance on expert judgment. In contrast, because the philanthro-
capitalists work with global NGOs rather than governments, they provide the
randomistas with relative immunity from the political resistance to randomized assign-
ment. The randomistas themselves, therefore, are not a necessary condition. An
alternative scenario in which private donors ally themselves with a different group of
experts conducting RCTs is entirely conceivable. The randomistas are a contingent
factor, a Bhistorical switchman^ that happened to be in the right place at the right time.
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For this very reason, however, their distinctive, contingent characteristics play a crucial
role in shaping the final result, which justifies the attention we pay to their formative
experiences.
In the fifth section, we analyze the elective affinities between the worldviews of the
randomistas and the philanthro-capitalists to show how homologous struggles lead to
the formation of an alliance across field boundaries. We draw on Daston and Galison’s
(1992, p.82) analysis of objectivity as a profoundly negative concept, whose meaning is
derived from whatever facet of subjectivity is problematized as dangerous or mislead-
ing. This means that an ideal of objectivity, like the preference for RCTs, typically
constructs an image of the virtuous expert, characterized by a set of ascetic values
(ibid., pp. 83, 122), through rejection of qualities that thereby come to be understood as
Bsubjective.^ From Bourdieu’s point of view, this must be understood as a strategy
seeking to change the balance of power within a field. The qualities problematized as
Bsubjective^ are likely to be the virtues claimed by the orthodoxy of the field. Indeed,
the orthodoxy does not consider them subjective at all, but constitutive of what Porter
(1995, pp. 3–4) calls Bdisciplinary objectivity,^ namely the specialized knowledge held
by expert communities. In contrast, the new virtues of mechanical objectivity are
championed by heterodox challengers seeking to delegitimize their opponents. We
show that the randomistas and the philanthro-capitalists share an enthusiasm for
measurement and Btrust in numbers^ rooted in their common attack on the Bbiases^
of expert judgment. They share a distinct preference for leverage strategies, whereby a
small intervention is strategically deployed to achieve much larger ends, because of
their common criticism of the ideological attachment of government planners to
Bprograms.^ And they agree on an ascetic, self-limiting vision of the virtuous expert
as a Bchoice architect^ practicing Blibertarian paternalism.^
Data and methods
To compare the two waves of RCTs in international development, we used two
analytical strategies. The first step was to construct two datasets, each a sample from
the total population of studies in each period. Then we were able carry out a compar-
ison of these datasets.
To obtain a sample of studies from the first wave, we consulted extensive reviews
published by the World Bank in collaboration with the Population Council (Cuca and
Pierce 1977; Searle 1985), as well as web-based repositories of published RCTs
produced by the Campbell Collaboration and 3ie—the International Initiative for
Impact Evaluation. To correct for a possible bias towards over-representation of studies
supported by these organizations, we also searched major academic databases in health,
economics, and public policy provided by platforms such as EbscoHost and the Central
Trials Registrar from the Cochrane Library.3 Additional bibliographies were located by
following citations in this initial list (Riecken and Boruch 1975; Boruch et al. 1978;
Bauman 1997).
3 We also conducted interviews and exchanged emails with key academic figures from the first wave, as well
as with Trials Search Coordinators from the Campbell Collaboration and the Cochrane Library to look for
possibly missing repositories and reviews from the period.
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This search strategy yielded a population of 114 experimental studies conducted
from 1953 to 1986 in developing countries. By reading the abstracts or bibliographic
annotations about these studies, we determined that only 60 qualified as experimental
studies comparing treatment and control groups (half of which conducted between
1966 and 1973), while the other 54 were quasi-experimental studies.4 Finally, we
obtained a corresponding report or publication for each of the 60 experimental studies,
either from published sources or from the archives of the World Bank, USAID, and the
Population Council. Each report was read by one of the researchers and coded for
multiple aspects of the evaluation (duration, size of sample, implementing partners,
region, and unit of randomization).
Obtaining a sample of second wave RCTs was more straightforward because the
online library of the MIT Poverty Lab provides a complete list of RCTs conducted by J-
PAL and affiliates. Our analytical sample was defined on January 13th, 2016. Of the
625 RCTs that were listed in J-PAL’s library that month, we excluded 100 studies that
were not conducted in developing countries. We then drew a random sample of 100
RCTs to be analyzed. From these, we excluded all RCTs that were still on-going or for
which we could not identify a corresponding publication or policy report. This left us
with a final sample of 63 RCTs. As with the first wave sample, for each RCT, we read
its corresponding academic paper or policy report to extract the relevant information.
We then crosschecked data from these publications with detailed information about
funding partners and experimental design provided in J-PAL’s website.5
Additionally, the account of the second wave relies on three years of participant
observation with randomistas by one of the authors, Luciana de Souza Leão. During
this period, the author participated in the fieldwork of two RCTs related to microfinance
in Peru (2007), as well as in the fieldwork, data analysis, and publication of one RCT in
the field of financial education in Brazil (2010–2012). Since we do not possess similar
firsthand information about the first wave, we rely on fieldwork information that
appeared in archival sources, as well as our interview with Robert Boruch, a key leader
of the first wave (on August 31st, 2016).
The second strategy was to analyze the controversy regarding RCTs that appears in
academic and policy publications during the second wave. The publications analyzed
include articles in economics journals, transcripts and PowerPoints of international
development conferences, opinion pieces, and blog posts of key development econo-
mists. This secondary literature was particularly useful to examine the ways that
advocates and critics narrate the contemporary success of RCTs, as well as to identify
the elective affinities between the randomistas and the philanthro-capitalists.
Comparison of the two waves of RCTs
In both waves, academic entrepreneurs similarly set out to organize RCTs and to
convince relevant audiences that the experimental method would turn foreign aid into
a Bscience of development.^ While this effort faltered in the first wave and RCTs were
4 Experimental designs that did not clearly explain how the control group was assigned, or that used average
data from the population as control, were considered quasi-experimental.
5 A list with all the studies in our two samples is available upon request.
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ultimately replaced by other evaluation methods, it seems–at least from the present
vantage point (2019)—to have been successful in the second wave. In this section, we
analyze the differences between the two waves along two dimensions—the composi-
tion of the expertise network necessary to carry out RCTs and the characteristics of the
projects evaluated—to explain why the second succeeded where the first failed. In
accordance with the theoretical framework developed earlier, we place particular
emphasis on two factors that explain why political resistance to randomized assignment
is less significant for the second wave—allowing RCTs to function as a hinge between
fields—than it was for the first. First, while the prestige of second wave economists, the
resources they command, and the much tighter coupling of the network they construct-
ed, all play a role in explaining the final result, the key difference seems to be their
strategic alliance with private foundations as compared with the reliance of first wave
researchers on governmental agencies. Second, the shorter duration and limited scope
of second wave RCTs similarly explain why the resistance to randomized assignment
does not pose as significant an obstacle for them, as it did for first wave RCTs
evaluating long-term, large-scale programs.
Who: participants in the expertise network of RCTs
The most obvious difference in the composition of the networks of expertise (Eyal
2013) involved in RCTs is the disciplinary affiliation of the leading researchers. Table 1
reports the disciplinary affiliation of authors of the papers/reports in our samples of first
and second wave RCTs. While academic economists predominate in the second wave
authors (80%), there were no economists among the 76 first wave authors for whom we
identified a disciplinary specialization.6 Instead, roughly 20% of these 76 hail from
other social sciences or affiliated disciplines (psychology, sociology, population studies,
and statistics), with an even larger group (~30%) hailing from public health (physicians,
epidemiologists, etc.). These academics typically also held administrative or research
positions at the Population Council or were hired as consultants by the World Bank or
USAID. The table also lists a smaller group (18.3%) consisting of staff members of
these organizations whose disciplinary affiliation was not identified. The leadership of
the second wave, therefore, is more cohesive and more autonomous than the first
wave’s. This is important because of what it means for negotiating with funders,
obtaining resources and maintaining tight control over other parties, and for being able
to convert policy-related work back into academic and scientific capitals.7
Field experiments in development economics, however, are not conducted by senior
researchers alone. While they are the personified Bauthors^ of the evaluation, the RCT
is a product of the full expertise network described below. A complex organizational
effort is required to coordinate the activities of multiple parties and, most importantly,
6 There is a large number of missing values (unknown disciplinary affiliation) in our first wave data (28% of
authors), but we do not think this casts doubt on the finding. Given the decades that have passed, it is not
surprising that it is more difficult to identify the disciplinary affiliation of first wave authors. The unidentified,
however, are unlikely to be US-based economists because this is the category easiest to identify. We suspect
that most were local researchers.
7 Of 32 development papers in the top 5 economics journals in 2015, 10 were RCTs, up from zero in 2000
(Duflo 2016). No first wave studies, in contrast, appeared in high-visibility disciplinary journals. The main
venue was Studies in Family Planning, an interdisciplinary journal published by The Population Council.
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to control the control group and prevent attrition. This effort is made evenmore complex
by the fact that these RCTs are implemented in remote areas of extremely poor countries,
in the absence of administrative data available in more developed countries, and having
to negotiate language and cultural barriers (Teele 2014). In what follows, we compare
the two waves in terms of the necessary components of such a network: 1) Coordinating
Center; 2) Field Staff; 3) Implementation Partners; and 4) Funders.8
The coordinating center of the second wave is a novel organizational entity, the so-
called BPoverty Lab.^ It is a complex organizational structure with central offices in
prestigious academic institutions in the United States and regional offices throughout
the Global South. These offices are run by a research team composed of a mix of senior
and junior professors. As can be seen in Table 2, the composition of senior researchers
at the coordinating center closely tracks the composition of authors in our second wave
sample: 93% have PhDs in Economics or Applied Economics, two-thirds (65%) teach
in Economics departments, while the others are in Business (15%) and Public Policy
Schools (9%). Most of these professors, moreover, have done consulting work at
international development organizations (85%), especially the World Bank (25%).
They formulate the research question and experimental design, construct the question-
naires, analyze the data, and publish the papers. No less importantly, they negotiate
with the implementing partners and funders.
In contrast, most first wave authors held administrative or research positions in large
US-based nonprofits that were tightly linked to US foundations and government.
Roughly 20% of authors in Table 1 were employed as full-time staff, while many
others held a part-time position as consultants or advisers at non-profits such as the
Population Council or SSRC’s special committee on social experimentation, or at
USAID (Riecken and Boruch 1975, p. ix). In short, the coordinating center of the first
wave, where operating procedures and reports were put together, was located within the
very same institutions that also provided the funding, technology, and research teams. It
8 Another necessary component are the policy beneficiaries themselves, but we do not possess data that would
allow us to compare them.
Table 1 Disciplinary affiliations of authors in first and second waves of RCTs
First wavea (%) Second waveb (%)
Academic economists 0 80.1
Other social scientists 18.3 6.4
Public health and medicine 29.8 4
Staff, unknown disciplinec 18.3 0.5
Business & finance 0 4.5
Math & statistics 2.9 0
Others 3.9 1.5
Unknown 26.8 3
a Percentage from sample of 104 authors from 55 studies
b Percentage from sample of 202 authors from 63 studies
c Staff of foundations, NGOs, and governments
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was a nexus of institutions closely aligned with the US government, wherein there was
a definite affinity between Bdevelopment^ and the extension of US influence
(Heydemann and Kinsey 2010, p. 222).
This is important to understanding the differences between the two waves. Re-
searchers at the coordinating center in the 1960s and 1970s did not enjoy the benefits of
the organizational structure of Poverty Labs, specifically the autonomy (and symbolic
capital) associated with Ivy League universities. This novel organizational entity allows
second wave randomistas, as they themselves admit (Rotemberg 2009), to attract their
own sources of funding and implementing partners and to negotiate with these from a
position of strength, relatively insulated from political pressures. Consequently, they
were able to secure large amounts of funding not just for specific projects, but also for
infrastructure such as the creation of regional offices and employment of large field
staff. This, in turn, made them extremely attractive partners for NGOs.
The actual RCT, however, is conducted by field staff located at the project site. Here, once
again, there is a stark difference between the two waves. The contemporary Poverty Lab
employs at its regional offices a large group of recent graduates from US universities, who
mediate between the coordinating center and a variety of local actors whose cooperation is
necessary for implementation. In January 2016, there were 123 research assistants employed
in J-PAL’s seven global offices. As can be seen in Table 3, most were trained in Economics,
but many majored in other disciplines related to development studies and public policy.
Table 2 Disciplinary affiliations of J-PAL affiliated professors (research team at coordinating center)
Current departmenta (%) PhD fielda (%)
Economics 65.1 85.3
Business school 14.7 0
Applied economics 3.7 7.8
Political science/politics 4.6 2.9
Public policy/government 9.2 3.9
Education 0.9 0
Global health 1.8 0
a Percentage from sample of 109 affiliated professors (JPAL 2016)
Table 3 Disciplinary affiliations of J-PAL junior research staff at regional offices
Field of graduate degreea (%) Field of undergraduate degreea (%)
Economics 35 41
Development studies 19 0
Public policy 20 5




a Percentage from sample of 123 research staff (JPAL 2016)
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First wave field teams, in contrast, even when led by academic researchers, typically
lacked this intermediate layer of academically trained auxiliary staff. The few initiatives
to create regional centers came to naught because funders and universities were not
keen on making the necessary investments (Interview with Boruch). Research assis-
tants were obtained by partnering with local universities and research centers. This
meant that first wave researchers were much more reliant on local implementation
partners and local bureaucracies and thus more exposed to political resistance to
randomization.
The field staff must collaborate with implementation partners in order to carry out
the experiment. To implement an RCT in education policy, for example, one has to
secure the cooperation of the Ministry of Education and school districts; one may need
teachers to administer the intervention, or perhaps contract with an NGO to conduct it.
The local staff of NGOs or government agencies are the most crucial group to control,
because they have to differentiate their day-to-day practices to create and maintain the
division between treatment and control groups. As can be seen in Tables 4, 65% of the
implementation partners of first wave studies were central and local government
agencies, together with local universities and nonprofits. International nonprofit
organizations accounted for a mere 6.3%. If we exclude USAID and The
Population Council from the total—because strictly speaking they were not
implementation partners, but the coordinating center—the representation of
domestic partners would rise to 75%. At the field site, it was mostly the local
government staff in partnership with researchers and students from local uni-
versities that implemented interventions, administered questionnaires, and col-
lected data. Far more sensitive to local political pressures, they were the most
likely source of substitution bias and resistance to randomization: Bexperimental
control was not a high priority for Salvadoran administrators who were trying
to deal with a major educational reform … the political necessity of introducing
the reform as a package outweighed th[e] preference [for RCT]^ (Hornick et al.
1973, pp. 274–276; see also USAID 2009, p. 18).
Table 4 Implementing partners in first and second waves of RCTs
First wavea (%) Second waveb (%)
For-profit organization 0 39.4
International nonprofit 6.3 18.1
The Population Council & USAID 12.6 0
Other US government agency 2.1 0
US University 13.7 2.1
National government 21 11.7
Local government 7.4 8.5
Local university 25.3 3.2
Local nonprofit 11.6 17
a Percentage from sample of 95 partners from 52 studies
b Percentage from sample of 94 partners from 61 studies
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In contrast, randomistas rely on local bureaucracies to a much lesser extent and
instead draw on a new set of implementation partners that mostly did not exist earlier:
global NGOs, for-profit organizations (primarily banks involved in micro-finance
schemes), and local survey firms. Together they comprise 75% of implementation
partners. This means that fieldwork teams in the second wave arrive at a setting that
is better prepared in terms of infrastructure for data collection, as compared with the
first wave. It also means that the coordinating center and regional offices in the second
wave are in a better position to control the implementation of the experimental design
and to ignore political resistance to randomized assignment. Working with these
NGOs, rather than governments, Bis key to enabling randomization and over-
coming ethical concerns^ because NGOs do not Bhave to pretend to serve everyone^
(Ogden 2016, pp. xx-xxi).
Finally, implementing RCTs in developing countries requires a significant amount of
funding. The donors should be understood as an integral part of the RCTs’ network of
expertise since without their input the task would not be accomplished and there would
not be a functioning hinge. Moreover, their expectations play an important role in
shaping research. As can be seen in Table 5 below, the main funding sources for first
wave studies were the Population Council and USAID, to which we can add also the
Bold^ Foundations, Ford and Rockefeller (the Population Council being a subsidiary of
Rockefeller). The coordinating center of the network, therefore, represented 48% of the
total funding sources. Local governments, universities, and nonprofits provided another
20% of funding sources. In contrast, the main funding sources for second wave studies
are international organizations and NGOs, which constitute a third of funding sources
(with the World Bank accounting for more than half of these), as well as other US
foundations (17.5%). Chief among the latter is a new breed of foundations including
the Bill and Melinda Gates (6%) and the McArthur (5%) Foundations.
While superficially it may seem that private foundations play the same role in the
two waves, there are several key differences that set the new foundations radically apart
from their predecessors. Most importantly for our purposes, as Heydemann and Kinsey
(2010, p. 222) explain, Ford and Rockefeller foundations worked closely together with
the US government, and their Bactivities … [were subordinated] to the foreign policy
priorities of the state.^ They even Bdrew their leadership and senior staff [from] men
who had gained managerial experience in government agencies […], who carried into
their positions commitments … to advance the policy priorities of the state.^
This state-foundations alliance (and revolving door) has been replaced, in the second
wave, by a university-foundations alliance. The foundations led by philanthro-
capitalists purposefully distance themselves from US-government influence and do
not see themselves as an auxiliary arm of US foreign policy. They explicitly aim to
replace the previous ethos with business oriented-models (see Reckhow 2013 for a
summary), where they make strategic investments and alliances with academic centers.
For this reason, the numbers in Table 5 actually underrepresent the impact of these
foundations, since they do not account for the significant infrastructural funding they
provided for Poverty Labs or their host universities (which constitute another 20% of
funding sources). Typically, it was not the lab, but the university, which appeared as
award recipient in foundations’ reports. Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), for
example, appeared as awardee for a total of $31,500,000 from the Gates Foundation
in the last ten years (Gates Foundation 2016), but even larger sums were awarded to
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Yale University, where IPA is based. Thus, the total for IPA must have been signifi-
cantly higher. This is true as well for J-PAL, which describes its own history as
consisting of a series of awards from private foundations that allowed BJ-PAL to grow
significantly^ and to establish regional centers. The creation of J-PAL Africa in 2010,
for example, was made possible Bwith the support from the William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation.^ (JPAL 2016) Additionally, new sources of funding are the government
agencies of other OECD countries.
This transformation in the composition of funders was the decisive, necessary
condition making possible the multiple ways in which the second wave network
differed from the first’s and thus accounting for its success. In the first wave, the
coordinating center composed of state agencies, as well as foundations closely tied to
the US government, also provided the bulk of the funding. Additional funding and
implementation partners came from the public sector in developing countries. In
contrast, the contemporary network reflects a process of pluralization of funding
sources (Babb and Chorev 2016), wherein a key role is played by a new set of private
foundations. This difference is important not because private capital is nimble while
state agencies are bureaucratic and slow, but because it significantly modified the
political context in which RCTs operate, reducing the obstacles to randomization and
the sources of substitution bias. It thus allowed the turning of RCTs into a functioning
hinge between the fields of academic economics and development aid.
What is being evaluated?
The second dimension of difference between the two waves is that contemporary
evaluations are focused on small, short-term interventions, while the object of evalu-
ations in the 1960s and 1970s were relatively large-scale, long-term social policy
programs. By Bsmall,^ however, we do not mean the size of the sample, but the
Table 5 Funding sources in first and second waves of RCTs
First wavea (%) Second waveb (%)
International organizationsc 19.6 33.3
The Population Council & USAID 36.9 5
Other US government agency 4.3 6.7
Other OECD governments 0 7.5
Ford and rockefeller foundations 10.9 0
Other US foundation 4.3 17.5
US University 2.2 20
Local sourcesd 19.6 4.2
For-profit organizationse 2.2 5.8
a Percentage from sample of 46 sources from 27 studies
b Percentage from sample of 120 sources from 52 studies
c Including World Bank, International Planned Parenthood Federation, UNICEF
d Local governments, nonprofits, universities, and think-tanks
e Banks, financial institutes, and private companies
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character of the intervention. Typically, second wave RCTs do not aim to assess
whether an overall policy works or not, but to evaluate the effect of one specific,
limited Bnudge^ or Bplumbing detail^ of the policy (Duflo 2017) on a selected outcome
of interest, e.g., effect of sending text message reminders on micro-finance clients’
repayment rates (Karlan et al. 2014; Duflo et al. 2007, p. 3; Ravallion 2009). As Duflo
(2017, p. 4) says, the interventions tested often involve Btaking care of apparently
irrelevant details, such as the way the policy is communicated or the default options
offered to customers,^ or they involve Blogistical decisions^ that hitherto had been
treated Bpurely mechanically.^ Samples of second wave RCTs, therefore, can be quite
large (e.g., 75 elementary schools, 30,000 students [Miguel and Kremer 2004]),
precisely because the intervention itself is limited. The sample size in these cases is
more a function of the improved ability to run surveys than an indicator of the scope of
the study.
We compare, therefore, the first and second waves not in terms of sample size, but
the type of intervention and its duration. In 29 of 63 studies in our second wave sample,
what is being tested is not the policy itself, but a specific Bnudge^ meant to overcome a
cognitive or behavioral obstacle to policy uptake (Berndt 2015, p. 8; Duflo 2017, pp. 4,
11). In 19 other studies, the intervention deals with a Bplumbing detail^ or Bdesign of
the tap^ problem by providing information or brief training Duflo (2017, pp. 4–5). In
15 other studies, the intervention remains small by piggybacking on an existing
government or NGO program.
When the intervention is limited in this way, its duration is quite short and can range
from a 5–10 min meeting with a microcredit officer to a 2–3 hrs financial literacy
workshop, typically accompanied by follow-up measurements of the financial behavior
of Bthe poor^ for a few months (Drexler et al. 2014). As can be seen in Tables 6, 52.6%
of second wave studies belong to this category, where the duration of intervention is no
more than 1 month (in fact, 22 of these studies, or 35% of second wave sample, involve
merely a few hours of training, workshop, watching videos, etc., during a one-day
visit). This was true for only 4.9% of first wave studies. Similarly, while there were
38.6% of second wave RCTs that lasted a year or more, the corresponding figure for the
first wave is 63.4%, including studies that extended for 8 or 9 years.
The longer duration of first wave studies goes a long way towards explaining why
randomized assignment was not as widespread as in the second wave, and why it was
ultimately abandoned. Having to contend with the continued resistance of the
aforementioned Salvadoran administrators, Hornick et al. (1973) report that Bfailure
of the randomization procedure undermined the validity of the experiment, while
Table 6 Duration of intervention in first and second waves of RTCs
First wave (%)a Second wave (%)b
1 month of less 4.9 52.6
2–12 months 31.7 8.8
1 year or more 63.4 38.6
a Percentage from 41 studies
b Percentage from 57 studies
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administrative difficulties affected the comparison (…) With the failure of the exper-
iment, a less rigorous design was adopted.^ BTrue^ RCTs in our first wave sample had
an average duration of 16 months, while the average duration of field experiments
without random assignment was 29 months. A review of 96 family planning experi-
ments from the same period found a similar trend, implying the presence of substitution
bias: Bcomparability [between control and treatment groups] decreases with the pas-
sage of time. The longer the time span the greater the likelihood that other factors will
intrude. (…) In such cases the advantage of having controls is greatly diminished^
(Cuca and Pierce 1977, p. 35).
Not only were experiments in the 1970s much longer, but more importantly they
attempted to evaluate whole delivery systems in broad social policy areas. Often, they
compared not intervention with no-intervention, but different levels of intervention to
determine which is most cost-effective. For example, a study by the Population Council
(1986) had physicians travel to remote community clinics to insert IUDs, provide
gynecological services, and treat clients with reported side effects from contraceptive
use. The study randomly assigned clinics to 1, 2, or 4 physician’s visits per month to
determine the optimal level of treatment. It ran for several years and provided reports
every 6 months.
Likewise, the geographical scope of first wave experiments was much larger than
contemporary ones. It was common to conduct experiments that took place over the
entire national territory of countries such as Barbados, Nicaragua, and Taiwan. One
study of family planning conducted in India employed 6500 field-workers who visited
2.4 million households in 28,000 villages and towns (Cuca and Pierce 1977, p. 123).
The largest second wave RCT, in contrast, involved 20,858 students in 386 schools
(Borkum et al. 2012).
Put differently, the expertise networks in the two waves of RCTs differed not only in
terms of the actors involved, but also in terms of what actually was being evaluated by
RCTs. In the first wave, the object of evaluation was a wholesale program of long
duration. Such evaluations required a significant component of monitoring, answerable
to Federal criteria originally established for domestic programs, bringing into play
questions of implementation, maintenance, fatigue, equity, and political considerations
(Berk et al. 1985). In practice, this meant that the experiments were expected to provide
information about the long-term Bimpact^ of the program, and thus had to contend with
the legal and political barriers that the program might have to face in future expansion.
The question of Boperational validity^—namely, how to replicate the experiment’s
results Bin a larger environment… includ[ing] the issues of resource requirements and
acceptability of the experimental approach on a wide scale^—was front and center
(Cuca and Pierce 1977, p. 7).
In the second wave, in contrast, the object of evaluation is typically a short-term
intervention, explicitly striving to be Bclever,^ i.e., well-bounded and easily measur-
able. BThe interventions are designed to answer a specific practical problem in a
specific context; for example, how to get teachers to come to school more often, how
to help farmers to save more, how to convince parents to get their children
immunized^ (Duflo 2006, p. 3). There is comparatively little interest in how the
intervention might be Bscaled up,^ often explicitly leaving it to other actors, especially
governments, who may or may not choose to get involved. This contrast in the duration
and scope of RCTs provides additional insight into why RCTs were discontinued in the
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first wave, but are thriving in the second wave. It means that the problem we identified
earlier—the political resistance to randomized assignment—was less significant in the
second wave.
The need to evaluate large scale, long-term programs during the first wave—itself a
function of the inter-governmental nature of development aid—ultimately meant that
randomization had to be abandoned or marginalized in favor of long-term monitoring
of implementation. First wave experimenters, therefore, were told that Bnot only the
content, but also the methodology must be adaptable to a variety of environments….
Although ideally the design should conform to the requirements of a true experiment,
conditions might have to be modified for certain purposes … where a quasi-
experimental design might well suffice^ (Cuca and Pierce 1977, pp. 12–13). There is
no justification, argued Dennis and Boruch (1989, p. 301), Bfor evaluation in general or
to randomized field experiment in particular, unless the results are likely to be useful.^
This often meant tailoring the design of evaluation to Bmeet the ethical demands of the
setting^ and conducting a randomized experiment only if certain Bthreshold
conditions^ were met. Since Btheir objective was to inform policy,^ researchers in
Barbados Bdid not use a no-treatment control group^ because it was Bpolitically
inappropriate^ (ibid., p. 302). Ultimately, this is why at the end of the first wave, RCTs
were not so much discontinued, but came to be understood as Bresearch^ rather than
evaluation. Not being able to overcome the political resistance to randomized assignment
meant that RCTs could not function as the Bhinge^ between the academic and develop-
ment aid fields andwere assigned amostly academic (Bresearch^) value. From the point of
view of key actors in the field of development aid, Brigorous field trials^were perceived as
taking too long and encountering too much resistance, so priority was given to Bquick
turnaround, cost-effective evaluation tools^ that could be employed in continuous mon-
itoring of programs as they were being implemented (USAID 2009, pp. 16–18).
Moreover, the very nature of the alliances among USAID, the Population Council,
and the governments of developing countries meant that at stake in the results of field
experiments was the larger question of the role of foreign aid in international develop-
ment. Hence the switch, over time, toward emphasizing implementation research and
long-term follow-up, and away from randomization.
Randomistas in the second wave face the same problems whenever their studies take
too long. A study of microfinance in India became messy over time as many people in the
control areas took loans offered by competing microfinance companies. After three years,
Bcompetitors were everywhere,^ and Duflo had to settle for an imperfect measurement
strategy (quoted in Parker 2010). Most of the time, however, randomistas address the
potential resistance to randomized assignment by going small and short-term. When the
intervention is small—a text message or a Bfree cooking stove^—it is relatively trivial to
persuade people to participate in a control group, and the Bresearcher might, with a clear
conscience, randomize the order in which people are supplied^ (ibid.).
An additional benefit of RCTs being marketed as answering small, well-defined
questions is that one is able to avoid the controversies regarding the long-term
advisability of development aid. Local NGOs who consent to participate in RCTs, do
so because short-term interventions seem less politically risky than full-fledged pro-
grams. Hence, family planning field experiments are a tiny proportion of J-PAL’s
portfolio, since they tend to be politically fraught, raise suspicions regarding the overall
aim of development aid, and require a long-time horizon. When they fail, they call into
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question the whole recent history of development aid. By comparison, short-term
nudges do not bring into view the overall role that NGOs and private foundations play
in the development aid matrix. The main implication of a negative finding is that you
should try again by varying a different aspect of the Bbehavioral game^ being played
(Banerjee and Duflo 2011; Banerjee et al. 2015).
If challenged about the limited scope of their experiments, randomistas counter that
they are not only meant to find out what works and what does not, but also to Btest
economic theory.^ BWe’re not just evaluating a program and attaching some larger
thoughts at the end, but finding ways to use evaluation to explore theories^ (Duflo, in
Parker 2010). Accordingly, a recent review of the use of experiments in economics
states:
This current generation of field experiments oftentimes has more ambitious
theoretical goals than social experiments (which largely aim to speak to
policymakers); modern field experiments in many cases are designed to test
economic theory, collect facts useful for constructing a theory, and organize data
to make measurements of key parameters.... (Levitt and List 2008, p. 19)
Paradoxically, what allows contemporary projects to be short is precisely this talk
about a Bmore ambitious theoretical agenda^. We should take it with a grain of salt. It is
not more ambitious, but differently wired. Randomistas avoid the political debate about
development by limiting themselves to testing behavioral hypotheses that often could
be quite innocuous (Bif you give textbooks to school children, they get better grades^).
What makes them Bmore ambitious^ is that they are connected back to the discipline of
economics, not to a social program’s bureaucracy. Randomistas are not concerned
about the limited and short-term nature of RCTs, because they consider each evaluation
as merely one little piece in a greater puzzle, part of a slow accumulation of knowledge.
Ultimately, they promise, the knowledge accumulated will be brought back to influence
policy. What economists Bbring to the table,^ is not only evaluation expertise, but
Bprior evidence and theories that help them to predict what should work^ (Duflo 2006,
p. 3). This means, essentially, that whether the field experiment is considered part of
theory building, thus appealing to disciplinary audiences, or is understood to elucidate a
Bplumbing detail,^ thus appealing to policy-makers and NGOs, is kept strategically
ambiguous (Banerjee et al. 2015, pp. 21–22; Rayzberg 2019). In this way, and unlike
the first wave, the small, short-term RCTevaluating a policy/theory-relevant Bnudge^ is
able to function as a hinge, linking the fields of academic economics and development
aid. It permits foundations and NGOs to legitimize their selective giving by its
Bmeasurable impact,^ while academic economists are able to frame their results as
relevant to disciplinary concerns.
The homologous transformations of development aid and economics
In this section, we draw on published accounts of the histories of international
development and academic economics to describe the parallel transformations in these
two fields. As each field underwent a crisis that destabilized its status quo, an opening
was created for newcomers to mobilize RCTs as a heterodox strategy challenging the
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field’s orthodoxy. Building on the conceptual framework we developed earlier, we
show how the homology between the struggles conducted in the two fields created an
elective affinity between the positions and strategies of the randomistas and the
philanthro-capitalists, leading them to settle on limited, short-duration RCTs as the
hinge linking their parallel struggles. The limited and short-term nature of these RCTs,
as we saw, minimized the political resistance to randomized assignment, while provid-
ing dual rewards in the two fields: apparently objective and effective short-term
solutions to the problem of triage in foreign aid, combined with long-term opportunities
for theory building in development economics. In this way, RCTs became a hinge
durably linking the two fields.
To be clear, there were institutionalized links between the two fields prior to the rise
of RCTs (Rayzberg 2019). There was circulation of personnel between the two, with
recent PhDs employed as applied economists in the World Bank and similar organiza-
tions, and former World Bank officials appointed as professors. There were organiza-
tional sub-units, which replicated the format of units from the other field (e.g., the
Development Research Group at the World Bank mimicking an academic department;
academic institutes combining research with policy-oriented activities).9 There were
multiple forums where a robust discussion about development was conducted among
experts from both academia and aid organizations, who shared a body of expert
knowledge acquired through common training, constituting what Porter (1995) calls
Bdisciplinary objectivity.^ Yet, as concurrent transformations destabilized both fields,
they also destabilized the authority of disciplinary objectivity, thus threatening to
rupture the most important link between them. This was the context in which a turn
to mechanical objectivity, represented by RCTs, could become a profitable strategy for
sub-groups in both field, and could serve as a Bhinge^ linking their parallel strategies.
The fragmentation of development aid
At any point in time, the field of development aid is composed of all actors involved in
designing, implementing, and funding development aid projects. These include foun-
dations and their personnel, as well as NGOs, national and local governments, multi-
lateral organizations, etc. The key argument of this section is that, while during the first
wave of RCTs (1960–1970), the field was organized around a dominant coalition, it has
become fragmented during the second wave, and it is this fragmentation that serves as a
condition of possibility for the success of second wave RCTs. In the earlier period, the
field of development aid was composed mostly of bilateral (e.g., USAID) and multi-
lateral (e.g., World Bank, UNESCO) organizations together with national governments
in developing countries (Krueger 1995). Private foundations, such as the Rockefeller
Foundation, were relevant actors, but as we saw, they essentially acted as auxiliary arms
of US foreign policy (Heydemann and Kinsey 2010, p. 222). Thus, the field centered
on the dominant alliance among US agencies, the old foundations, and national and
local governments in the developing world. In the second wave, in contrast, the field
9 These replicas of a unit from one ecology (a profession, a discipline, a political party,) within another are
what Abbott (2005, pp. 265–269) calls Bavatars.^ For example, applied economics is an avatar of academic
economics in the Bpolicy and advice arena.^ While an avatar is Ban institutionalized hinge,^ over time it can
become independent and even compete with its original creators.
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became fragmented, as the percentage of projects by the dominant alliance diminished
in favor of a new type of private foundations (the philanthro-capitalists), global NGOs,
and new country donors.
The fragmentation of the field of development aid was a complex process, which
involved not only the entry of new actors and the relative weakening of old ones, but a
related transformation of the Bdevelopment imagination^ and a loosening of the
previously tight linking among resources, norms, and ideas that characterized the field
in the era of the BWashington Consensus^ (Rodrik 2006; Babb and Chorev 2016). By
the late 1990s, the increasing attention to the problems of bad governance and
corruption among recipient governments polarized the field between those in an
Boptimist^ faction, led by Columbia University professor Jeffrey Sachs (2005), who
were still proposing large-scale, internationally coordinated efforts to combat global
poverty; and others in a Bpessimist^ faction, led by NYU professor and former World
Bank official, William Easterly (2007), who argued that development aid does more
harm than good, and that poverty can be tackled only by returning agency to poor
countries. This was more than just Baid fatigue.^ It signaled a profound crisis of
disciplinary objectivity, widespread skepticism among development experts about their
own ability to guide development aid. Some even proposed to end development aid all
together (Moyo 2009).
This weakening of the orthodoxy organized around ODA and disciplinary objectiv-
ity served as an opening for other actors—global NGOs, new country donors, and the
philanthro-capitalists—to enter the development aid field in the late 1990s, as evi-
denced by the rapid growth in the relative share of private international assistance
(Babb and Chorev 2016). No less importantly, it allowed the philanthro-capitalists to
play the role of a heterodoxy and to exert an influence far beyond their actual share in
total disbursement. The pessimist critique has led donors (including governments and
multilateral organizations) to channel greater flows of aid to new global NGOs with a
local footprint, and to the private sectors of developing countries, both of which became
natural allies of the philanthro-capitalists. In contrast to the development enterprise in
the 1960s and 1970s, donors increasingly rely on private transnational groups as
contractors and intermediaries, including for-profit development organizations
(Watkins et al. 2012)—USAID and the EU, for example, disbursed 30% of their
budgets through private for-profit groups in the year 2000 (Cooley and Ron 2002).
This fragmentation is significant less for the actual amount of money disbursed by
philanthro-capitalists,10 than for its impact on what Babb and Chorev (2016) call the
Bdevelopment imagination,^ tilting it in the direction of business-oriented norms (quick
turnaround, measurable results, and professionalized aid management). These new
norms are emphasized not only by the philanthro-capitalists, but also by government
agencies and multilateral organizations (Adams 2016). The World Bank, to cite one
example, has been rebranded by its current President as a Bdevelopment consultancy
10 The existing estimates are not yet reliable enough to determine the relative share of development aid coming
from private foundations. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) estimates that, since 2002, aid to
developing countries from Private Voluntary Organizations had been three times as large as ODA. This
number, however, includes not just direct development investments, but also private bank lending and
remittances, so it is an over-estimate. More accurate estimates are likely in the future since in 2010, the Gates
Foundation became the first private aid donor to report to the DAC, encouraging other foundations to do the
same (OECD 2011, p. 4).
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agency,^ and enjoined Bto think of ourselves now as strategic advisors, honest brokers
who link capital looking for a greater return to countries looking to achieve
their higher aspiration^ (Kim 2017). Similarly, many United Nations agencies,
USAID, and UK’s Department of International Development have invested
heavily in new Monitoring and Evaluation Units and development indicators
(Babb 2009; Watkins et al. 2012).
This transformation of the development imagination is evidence that the
orthodoxy—composed of the leadership of multilateral organizations and government
agencies disbursing or receiving ODA, together with the development experts serving
as their advisers—has lost its hold. The field became pluralized, as alongside and
relatively independent of the inter-governmental aid that was dominant during the first
wave, there emerged, as Krause (2014, pp. 4–5) suggested, a quasi-market where Bthe
good project^ is a quasi-commodity produced by global NGOs and consumed by
private donors who demand Bmeasurable results.^ Consequently, Bthe pursuit of the
good project develops a logic of its own that shapes the allocation of resources …
relatively independently of beneficiaries’ need^ (ibid.). To overcome what Swidler and
Watkins (2017) called the principal-agent problem of Baltruism from afar,^ or what
Krause (2014) calls the Btriage problem^ of how to allocate limited resources among
many competing needs, donors increasingly rely on issuing short-term, renewable
contracts for discrete aid projects, requiring NGOs to bid competitively and to dem-
onstrate concrete results (Berrios 2000). The result is a thoroughgoing transformation
of the type of aid disbursed from inter-governmental programmatic aid, such as long-
term funding for the whole education sector of a country, to project aid, given for a
specific intervention with a short time frame.
These changes served as a hospitable environment for the second wave of RCTs. On
the one hand, the polarization of the development aid debate invited a centrist strategy.
This is indeed what the randomistas did by combining the pessimist critique of large
developmental projects, with the activist attitude of the optimists. In this way, they
handed further ammunition to, and solidified their alliance with, the Bimpatient
optimist^ Bill Gates and other philanthro-capitalists. Their championing of RCTs as a
form of mechanical objectivity was predicated on problematization of the subjectivity
of development experts and government bureaucrats (i.e., an attack on the disciplinary
objectivity claimed by the orthodoxy), their tendency to become attached to big
programs because of ideological preconceptions. According to Duflo (2011), ideology
simplifies the causes of poverty and therefore dictates a preference for comprehensive
programs rather than small-scale, tailored interventions: BPrograms are often borne in
ideology… [that] the poor are entrepreneurs, or they are starving or they are slothful.
[Programs] are conceived in ignorance of the reality of the field, and then they persist
because once they exist there is a consistency for them to just continue. I think we need
to fight against that.^
To counter this subjectivity, randomistas emphasized not only the mechanical
objectivity of RCTs, but also their small scale and practical nature. The development
debate, they said, is couched at the wrong level. The big, philosophical questions such
as whether development aid is fundamentally helpful or not, or what the root causes of
global poverty are, cannot be answered. The debate is futile and leads to Bstagnation
and inertia^ (Karlan and Appel 2011, p. 5). What RCTs can offer, conversely, are
answers to small, practical, and topic-specific issues (Banerjee and Duflo 2011, p. 13).
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Randomistas thus offered RCTs as a means of bringing closure to the heated
controversy in the development aid community over how to address global poverty.
At the same time, they also offered a longer-term vision in which small, short-term
studies generate a virtuous cycle of knowledge accumulation. The second point is,
therefore, that the fragmentation of the development aid field and the emergence of the
quasi-market for Bgood projects^ offered an especially hospitable environment for
RCTs, provided that they remained small and short-term. It is hard to overestimate
the impact of this transformation on the scope for using RCTs. Given that the success of
randomization is inversely correlated to the length of the experiment, the short-term
nature of current projects, itself dictated by the episodic nature of funding in the quasi-
market, emerges as a key condition of possibility for the success of the second wave.
The inter-governmental ties characteristic of the first wave, in contrast, dictated a much
longer timeframe. The fact that researchers are now working with NGOs Bwho did not
have to pretend to serve everyone,^ rather than governments, means that the political
resistance to randomization is minimized: Bif you strongly believe that the program you
are running will benefit people, it would arguably be unethical to deny that program to
some people in order to create a control group. But if you cannot serve everyone
anyway, it is, again, arguably fairer to determine who is served via randomization^
(Ogden 2016, pp. xx-xxi; see also Glennerster 2015).11
The different parts of the hinge now work together seamlessly linking the two fields.
The RCTs provide the private donors and NGOs with precisely what they need to
pursue their heterodox strategy in the field of development aid—Bclear goals,^
Bmeasurable results,^ a demonstration that they are being Beffective altruists.^ NGOs
are encouraged to present evidence about the effects of the project according to
narrowly delimited aims (Babb and Chorev 2016, p. 95), and are discouraged
from taking into consideration the broader effects that a development interven-
tion might have (Krause 2014). In contrast, during the first wave, evaluators
could not abstract away from the broader, longitudinal impacts of foreign aid,
because the goal was precisely to stimulate sectorial, macro changes over the
long run (Sommer 1977; Freeman et al. 1980). RCTs’ promise to deliver an
unbiased (i.e., untainted by expert judgment) measure of the impact of a specific
intervention is key to translating and aligning the interests of donors and NGOs, while
the insulation from political pressures that the latter provide guarantees that the different
parts of the Bhinge^ are held together and the link between the two fields is durable. In
contrast, any attempt to assess the longer-term effects of a development program is likely
to drive them apart.12
11 The problems faced by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), which works primarily with
governments, underscore this point, demonstrating how hard it is for governments to randomize benefits.
Despite explicitly requiring all loans to undergo impact evaluations, IADB was able to conduct RCTs only in
26% of its loans and had to resort to a quasi-experimental design in the reminder. IADB (2017) representatives
reported that RCTs were seen as Bimposed on country governments, which are reluctant to appropriate RCTs
by themselves.^
12 Pritchett makes the same point, though perhaps more bluntly: BThe only people for which the RCT
movement is in fact a tool for the job are philanthropists…. From the charity perspective, there’s a nice
confluence between the methodological demand for statistical power and of being able to tweak at the
individual level. I can give this person food, but not that person. (…) I’m not trying to affect the government;
I’m not trying to affect national development processes.^ (in Ogden 2016, p. 142)
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The consequences of anomie in academic economics
Having demonstrated how short-term RCTs figured into heterodox strategies in a
destabilized field of development aid, let us move now to the concurrent set of
transformations in the field of the American economics profession in order to highlight
how RCTs figured into the homologous situation faced by young economists. In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, the field of economics was undergoing an Bempirical turn^:
the end of the hegemony of theoretically-oriented formal modeling and the proliferation
of empirically-oriented tendencies (Angrist et al. 2017), of which the most relevant for
our purposes were the debates in development economics about causal identification
and the rise of behavioral economics.
In development economics, the new, empirical mood appeared in the form of a shift
away from its previous focus on macroeconomic theories of international trade, human
capital, fiscal policies and their interrelations, towards an intensive interest—some
characterize it as an Bobsession^ (Jonathan Murdoch, in Ogden 2006, p.51)—with
the question of causal identification, namely Bhow… to separate out the causal impact
of a specific policy or factor from potential confounding factors^ (Michael Kremer,
ibid., p.1). Multiple observers, both critics and adherents of RCTs, cite the ensuing
debate as the formative context for the rise of RCTs (Lant Pritchett, ibid., p.140; Deaton
2010). They describe a milieu, especially at Harvard and MIT, where young develop-
ment and labor economists were trained to find an Binstrumental variable^ (IV), with
which to neutralize confounding factors and thus pinpoint the cause with a high degree
of confidence. At the same time, they were also trained to be highly skeptical of this
exercise, as they Bwatched every empirical paper … picked apart based on causal
claims,^ while some collaborated with statisticians to formulate an even more radical
critique of IVs (Murdoch, ibid., pp. 51–53). From our point of view, the crucial point
about these methodological debates is that they disrupted business as usual and
destabilized disciplinary objectivity. Observers describe an anomic situation, where BI
can sit in a seminar in Cambridge and whatever instrument you propose, I can concoct
a story in which your instrument is wrong.^ (Pritchett, ibid., p. 141). This
anomic situation increased the uncertainties and pressures concentrated in the
position of new entrants into the field (PhD students and young faculty
members), disrupting the normal process of reproduction. Graduate students
were Bhaving to fight these battles over the validity of their instruments,^ and
were finding it harder to publish their work (Murdoch, ibid., p. 55). In this
context, RCTs offered a means of escaping this predicament, or in Morduch’s
terms, of Bcreating a new kind of instrumental variable. Not one that you
stumble across. You create it. Carefully and deliberately (…). Randomization
provides the golden ticket, the Holy Grail from an IV perspective. RCTs are a
machine for creating credible instrumental variables^ (ibid.).
RCTs, in short, are not the much-touted Bgold standard,^ they are a much narrower
Bgolden ticket,^ namely a hall pass that shields a young scholar from the destructive
effects of an anomic situation where the consensus underlying disciplinary
objectivity has collapsed. Similar to RCTs’ role in bringing Bclosure^ to heated
debates in the development aid field, they proved to be a very powerful tool for
young economists to enter the booming empirically-oriented portion of the
economics field (Angrist and Pischke 2010).
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The parallel rise of behavioral economics in the 1990s, attacking the Bneo-classical^
homo economicus paradigm (Mullainathan and Thaler 2000), served as an additional
impetus for the rise of RCTs. While initially unrelated to the causal identification
debates, in retrospect it is possible to see similarities between the two movements.
Both were revivals of longstanding disputes within the economics profession—
behavioral economics harked back to Herbert Simon’s 1940s research program
(Heukelom 2012); the causal identification debates echoed the debates in the Cowles
Commission (Ogden 2016, p. 140). Both mobilized allies from outside the discipline—
statisticians and cognitive psychologists, respectively—to challenge the orthodoxy of
the field. Both had a strong academic base at Harvard University and MIT. Both
represented parallel heterodox offensives to pluralize economics by opening this
notoriously insular discipline to imports from other disciplines, thereby creating alter-
natives to the prevailing neoclassical orthodoxy (Santos 2011).
Both movements, finally, because they strove to pluralize the field, destabilized the
established criteria by which new work was evaluated, thereby disrupting the normal
process of reproduction. When behavioral economists criticized the lack of realism in
standard micro-economic theory, they opened the proverbial Bfloodgates.^ They too
were vulnerable to the criticism that their investigations lacked realism, because they
were conducted in the Bfake^ environment of experimental labs (Guala 2007). At the
same time, they were vulnerable to the counter-attack of micro-economic theorists that
their research is purely descriptive, without theoretical value, since it is unable to
explain how markets operate despite the limited rationality of the participants. These
critiques of behavioral economics provided an opening for the randomistas. They
offered young scholars a research paradigm that could claim to be far more realistic
than both laboratory studies and microeconomic theory. At the same time, they touted
the theoretical contribution of their field studies, designed to shed light on how Bthe
poor^ in developing countries actually make decisions in natural settings and to
demonstrate how nudges and ecological features can increase the rationality of their
decision-making (thereby demonstrating their relevance to economic theory)
(Berndt 2015).
Developing countries could then be seen as ideal testing grounds for some of
these theories…. There may be more to learn about human behavior from the
choices made by Kenyan farmers confronted with a real choice than from those
made by American undergraduates in laboratory conditions. (Duflo 2003, p. 9)
The two movements—causal identification and behavioral economics—intersect,
for example, in Esther Duflo. She was introduced to work on Bnatural experiments^ by
one of her dissertation advisors, Joshua Angrist (Parker 2010), a key figure in the causal
identification debates. At the same time, she drew on the work of behavioral econo-
mists to test whether cognitive biases are responsible for poverty traps (Duflo et al.
2011; see Berndt 2015, p. 8). This contingent combination shaped the distinctive
character of second wave RCTs and contributed to their success, because it provided
experimenters with a toolkit of small, short-term intervention—construed as
Bnudges^—while allowing randomistas to frame these experiments as contributing to
economic theory. Young scholars conducting field experiments could defend their work
as realistic, empirically rigorous, and theoretically relevant: BYou’re not just learning
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about what this particular program does in this particular place, but understanding
human behavior better^ (Rachel Glennerster, quoted in Parker 2010).
When the orthodoxy of the field counterattacks, pointing out the lack of external
validity of RCTs and the limited theoretical value of the results (Nobel Laurate Angus
Deaton went as far as to liken the randomistas to researchers testing Bthe idea that
parachutes are useful to people who jump out of planes^), the response of the
randomistas is extremely telling. When speaking to disciplinary audiences, they readily
admit that randomized assignment does not eliminate all the sources of error in causal
inference and that it is not an optimal research strategy if the expert Bplaces little weight
on persuading her audience.^ Yet, they say, if the expert is faced with an audience
consisting of Bstakeholders with veto power … whose priors may diverge from …
[one’s] own,^ and if it is of paramount importance to persuade this audience, then the
need to communicate as little Bbias^ as possible outweighs other considerations. In this
situation, when experts are faced with Ban adversarial audience who may be able to
veto [their] choices,^ and who is leery of the reliance on expert judgment, then
Brandomized experiments allowing for prior-free inference become optimal^
(Banerjee et al. 2016, pp. 2, 11–15).
One cannot fail to hear here an echo of their formative experiences, during which
they encountered the Badversarial audience,^ sitting Bin a seminar in Cambridge.^ Yet,
it is also clear that in the present context, the combative audience they now had in mind
were the philanthro-capitalists. In essence, they were justifying their preference for
RCTs by reference to the mistrust of experts prevailing, as we saw earlier, in the field of
development aid where, in the wake of the pessimist critique and collapse of the
Washington Consensus, there is Bloss of hope in development^ and lack of trust in
traditional development expertise (Krause 2014, p. 42). If you want to build an
enduring link to this other field, they seem to be saying, you must take into account
that your project has to be sold to donors who now Btrust in numbers^ (Porter 1995)
much more than they trust in expert judgement; who in fact perceive the theories and
experience of experts to constitute Bbias.^ RCTs, as a strategy that minimizes bias, is
best suited to build this link. This defense of RCTs could not have been formulated
during the first wave, when there was relative optimism about the possibilities of
development, about the power of multilateral organizations to do good, and about the
cogency of development expertise (Krueger et al. 1989).
Facing towards the field of development aid, RCTs served to translate and coordi-
nate the interests of the new coalition with private foundations and global NGOs, while
promising to bring closure to polarizing controversies and restore the objectivity of
development expertise. Facing towards the economics profession, field experiments
allowed young economists to navigate the anomic situation they faced, while parrying
the twin accusations of unrealism and pure description. By certifying that a certain
intervention Bworks,^ RCTs reassure private foundations and global NGOs that the
project—the quasi-commodity that links them—has produced a measurable difference,
thus validating their exchange, while leaving questions of Bscaling up^ for later. They
also reassure young economists that they are contributing to disciplinary knowledge.
What they no longer do, however, is precisely what was meant in the past for a program
to Bwork,^ namely evaluate whether it could be implemented on a large scale,




The objective basis of alliance between the randomistas and philanthro-capital-
ists, as the previous section established, is the homology between their posi-
tions and strategies in their respective fields. They were both newcomers, a
heterodoxy gearing to change business as usual. The subjective basis of their
alliance, however, is a set of values and images, which function as elective
affinities attracting the two sides to one another (Eyal 2000). The ascetic values
and image of the virtuous expert encoded by the mechanical objectivity of
RCTs are intelligible by way of contrast with the prevailing ethos of their
opponents, the orthodoxies of their field, whose approach to development aid
was thereby problematized and rejected as subjective and biased. By the same
token, these images allow the two groups to recognize each other as natural
allies.
i) Trust in Numbers: the most obvious affinity linking randomistas and
philanthro-capitalists is their emphasis on measurement. It clearly expresses
the most important factor that brought them together, namely their parallel
attacks on the orthodoxies of their fields, problematizing expert advice as
subjective and biased. Bill Gates’s 2013 annual letter on behalf of the Gates
Foundation was titled BWhy Measurement Matters^ (Gates Foundation 2016). It
was a passionate argument that BYou can achieve amazing progress if you set a
clear goal and find a measure that will drive progress toward that goal in a
feedback loop.^ This image of a feedback loop from measurement to policy is
noteworthy for what it leaves out—theory, experience, expertise, the knowledge
that the development aid community has presumably already accumulated—in
favor of what is presented as an almost mechanical tâtonnement, trial-and-error
(the analogy to machine learning seems apt). This preference for measurement
is premised on a problematization of theory or expert judgment as Bbias,^
preconceived, subjective opinion. The virtuous expert should have none: BOne
of my great assets of being in this business, or maybe I’ve developed it over
time, is I don’t have many opinions to start with […] I have one opinion—one
should evaluate things—which is strongly held. I’m never unhappy with the
results. I haven’t yet seen a result I didn’t like^ (Duflo, quoted in Parker 2010).
There is clear affinity between Duflo—who has acquired in the causal identi-
fication debate the ascetic predisposition to trade-off precision for a virtuous,
unbiased measure—and Gates, who plays the role of the adversarial, skeptical
audience that wants nothing of the expert’s priors, only this unbiased measure
that can Bdrive progress^ by itself.
This trust in numbers and mistrust of experts is dramatized and celebrated in a set of
institutional rituals—TED Talks, conference, and award nights—that bring the
philanthro-capitalists and randomistas together. They present themselves as disruptors
who are challenging the orthodoxies of their fields, while reaching out to allies across
boundaries. The randomistas present themselves as critics of armchair economics: Bto
find out what works on the ground, you need to climb down from the ivory tower and
do some serious legwork in the places you are trying to help^ (Duflo, quoted in Benko
2013). Thinking of economic research as hands-on accords with the worldview of
philanthro-capitalists like Gates, who is critical of academics Bdoing nothing more than
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teaching two classes a semester and pumping out armchair advice in academic
journals^ (Gates 2014). The philanthro-capitalists similarly present themselves as
poised to Brevolutionize philanthropy, making nonprofit organizations operate like
business, and creating new markets for goods and services that benefit society^
(Edwards 2017, p. 1). Thinking about philanthropy as business, as rational economic
action, comports with the worldview of economists. Ultimately, however, it is their
emphasis on measurement that makes them welcome guests in these forums. It is the
raison d’etre of outfits such as the Institute for Effective Altruism (IEA) and GiveWell,
which draw on the results of RCTs to publish shortlists of recommended NGOs to
which donors should give. The donors can Bsee for themselves what works,^ no longer
needing to rely on suspect expert advice. Or, seen from the other side, these outfits have
turned donors into this Badversarial audience,^ to whom only the randomistas are now
linked. Unsurprisingly, topping the shortlists are the poster children projects of J-PAL
(Givewell 2017). Invited guests include foundation leaders, J-PAL members, and allied
behavioral economists such as Cass Sunstein, whose talk title BFrom Behavioral
Economics to Public Policy^ neatly captured the alliance between economists and
donors.
ii) Leverage: while measurement cuts the expert-qua-advisor out of the science
of development aid, their joint enthusiasm for Bleverage^ demonstrates how
randomistas and philanthro-capitalists premise their alliance on cutting out
government planners as well. In randomistas’ eyes, attachment to
Bprograms^–large-scale, comprehensive, one-size-fits-all, typically government-
administered programs—reflects ideological bias. The virtuous expert, in con-
trast, is agnostic, targeted, and clever, approaching each situation anew
(Bwithout many opinions to start with^), looking for the right lever of change.
There is a strong affinity between the strategy of Bgoing small^ practiced by
randomistas; the Bnudges^ favored by behavioral economists; and the idea of
Bleverage^ dear to philanthro-capitalists. The latter distinguish themselves from
the older foundations, whose management style they criticize, precisely by
emphasizing their concern to deploy Bphilanthropic resources more
strategically,^ taking a Bmarket conscious^ and Bimpact oriented^ approach to
giving Bdriven by the goal of maximizing the ‘leverage’ of the donor’s money^
(Bishop and Green 2008, pp. 6, 152). They do not consider themselves donors,
but Bsocial investors^ or even Bventure philanthropists^ (Frumkin 2003). This
means the opposite from funding wholesale social programs. It is Ba portfolio
approach, experimenting with lots of different ideas that, if successful, might be
scaled-up by other institutions, including governments^ (ibid.). Leaving imple-
mentation and scale-up to others, means that the virtuous expert no longer
occupies the same position as the government planner. Clearly, Bleverage^ is
meant here not in the financial sense, as when a small amount of money brings
in much more, but in the sense that this small amount of money, correctly
invested, could ultimately have a much larger impact, either because its success
as proof of concept attracts other actors who will scale it up or because it is
targeted at a Blever^ of change.
Randomistas and behavioral economists cast themselves as the appropriate
partners sought by philanthro-capitalists by offering leverage in both these
senses. RCTs, with their promise to provide evidence on Bwhat works,^ have
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the power to certify (and de-certify) projects, thereby attracting more donors
and acting as levers for scaling-up.13 More interestingly, the conceit of
Bnudges^ is that people can be greatly influenced by small changes in context,
such as which food items are at eye level on a shelf (Thaler and Sunstein 2009,
pp. 1–2). Small actions creating a big impact is the textbook definition of
Bleverage.^ Nudges are levers of change. As Gates (2011) says in his review of
Banerjee and Duflo’s Poor Economics: Bsmall tweaks can sometimes turn
failing interventions into effective ones.^
iii) Libertarian paternalism: the third and final affinity between the worldviews
of the randomistas and the philanthro-capitalists is clearly shaped by their joint
centrist strategy in the development debate. Nudges and similar behavioral
interventions provide leverage because they activate the autonomous, self-
organizing powers of the actors themselves, especially their power of choice.
Nudges, thus, signify a certain combination of the technocratic rationalism of
the Boptimists,^ tempered with respect for the autonomy of the actors involved,
characteristic of the Bpessimists.^ It is precisely this combination that Thaler
and Sunstein (2009, pp. 4–6) aim at with the seeming oxymoron of Blibertarian
paternalism^: BWe argue for self-conscious efforts, by institutions in the private
sector and also by government, to steer people’s choices in directions that will
improve their lives.^ This combination is calculated to appeal to foundation
leaders, who would like to be Beffective altruists,^ yet are worried about
government intervention and coercion. Nudges offer them the possibility to
exercise Bgentle power^ (ibid., pp. 8, 11). Behavioral economics is thus offered
as a liberal art of government, an art of leading people gently towards rational
and self-interested action (Berndt 2015).
The preference for nudges over commands implies a vision of the virtuous
expert as a Bchoice architect^ (ibid., p. 3). This vision, which originated in
behavioral economics (Santos 2011), encapsulates the centrist strategy of
randomistas and philanthro-capitalists. On the one side, there is the paternalism
of Bprograms^ and the social planner, which they attribute to the heyday of the
older foundations and to an older generation of social scientists. On the other
side, there is the unbridled libertarianism of free market reforms and of the
theoretical micro-economists, who accord the expert the role of constitution-
giver and mechanism-designer (Eyal 2000). Choice architects, by contrast from
social planners, do not tell people what to do. Yet, unlike mechanism-designers,
they do not have as much faith in the power of the market to provide actors
with the best incentives to choose rationally. Thus, to induce Kenyan farmers to
save in order to buy fertilizer later, Duflo et al. (2011, p. 2353), demonstrate
that Ba paternalistic libertarian … approach of small, time-limited discounts
could yield higher welfare than either laissez-faire policies or heavy subsidies.^
Behavioral economists qua choice architects work to augment the rationality of
economic actors, so as to direct the market process towards collectively rational
and equitable goals. RCTs serve to test which organization in the context of
13 For example, total donations to the four charities shortlisted byGiveWell increased from $3,000,000 in 2010
to $110,000,000 in 2015. Conversely, when RCT evidence is inconclusive, projects lose their recommended
status and funding, as happened to Development Media International (Givewell 2017).
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choice works best to Bnudge^ individuals towards more rational choices, with-
out eliminating their freedom of choice.
There is an affinity here with the worldview of foundation leaders who hail
from the information technology sector: Bchoice architects can make major
improvements to the lives of others by designing user-friendly environments^
(Thaler and Sunstein 2009, p. 11). What else are software engineers doing but
Bdesigning user-friendly environments^ that imperceptibly guide the users towards
certain choices? The metaphor of architecture is pervasive in the information technology
world, and it is apt. A building (like a computer interface) channels the choices of its
users by its physical structure. The likelihood of certain choices is Bprogrammed^ into
the building by its architect. If choice is inescapable and indeed desirable, the alliance of
randomistas and philanthro-capitalists seems to say, you might as well do it in a Bsmart^
way, you might as well Bhack^ the process to make it more user friendly and to favor
rational choices.
Conclusions
In this article, we are arguing that the contemporary success of RCTs is better
understood as a product of historical and institutional processes that have changed
the political and scientific context in which RCTs are implemented, rather than as
evidence of their Bgold standard^ quality. By jointly mobilizing the concepts of Bhinge^
and Bhomology between fields,^ we show how the fragmentation of the development
aid field and changes in the economics profession made RCTs answerable to new
audiences and allowed randomistas greater leeway to bypass the political resistance to
randomization. The nudge-type, short-term RCTs serve as the Bhinge^ for the alliance
between randomistas and philanthro-capitalists and therefore enjoy broad appeal. In
our concluding remarks, we would like to address both practical and conceptual
implications of our findings.
A recent controversy about an RCT evaluating the educational benefits of
deworming in Kenya (Miguel and Kremer 2004) can illustrate the advantages
and limitations of Bgoing small^ for international development research and
practice. In this RCT, randomistas provided deworming medication for kids in
treatment schools. The intervention, therefore, was short-term and did not
address the entrenched problems of educational underfunding or limited labor
market prospects. It was rather a sort of Bhack^ of the development process that
was easy to administer and measure. Initially, researchers reported improve-
ments in test scores and school attendance not only for treated children, but also
spillover effects for kids that did not receive treatment. This led randomistas to prescribe
deworming medication as a cheaper and more effective solution to improve educational
outcomes in poor countries—a prescription that was followed by multiple donors and
that had affected 200 million children by 2015 (JPAL 2016). Unfortunately, in 2014,
after the data were made available online, multiple replications invalidated the main
finding and led to heated debate about the use of RCTs to test and prescribe social
policies (see Humpreys 2015).
From our point of view, however, the main implications of this controversy in
particular and of the widespread use of RCTs in general is that Bgoing small^ in
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development is often tantamount to Bsearching under the street light,^ i.e., to evaluating
only what can be easily and quickly administered and measured. Do we really need an
RCT to know that if children are less sick, they are more likely to go to school, and less
likely to get other kids sick? Evaluating this sort of intervention can generate impres-
sive results and cement the alliance with global foundations interested in demonstrating
the measurable impact of their giving. Yet, it also avoids the much harder questions,
such as the underfunding of educational systems in developing countries, or how to
motivate poor children to go to school when their labor market prospects are dim. In
other words, the Btargeted^ interventions characteristic of second wave RCTs obscure
the harder and more politically fraught task of addressing the complex mechanisms
reproducing poverty or of assessing the overall impact of policies.
The conceptual toolkit that we use to arrive at these conclusions also has broader
implications that extend beyond the study of RCTs. So far, sociologists studying how
distinct fields become durably connected to each other tended to place either the
strategic action of actors or the structural constraints of fields at the center of their
theories, instead of thinking about how the two interact and condition one another
given the contingencies of the historical case at hand. Typically, a focus on structural
constraints, especially in field theory, tended to underestimate the possibilities for
creating a durable link; while a focus on the strategic action of actors underestimated
the obstacles presented by the contrasting logics of the two fields. By combining the
concept of Bhinge^ with field analysis, however, we have provided other sociologists
with a more balanced approach to the question of how fields become durably linked.
Specifically, we are arguing that an adequate answer must demonstrate not only that a
strategy offers Bdual rewards^ in both fields, but also how it overcomes the resistance
stemming from the tensions between them. No less importantly, we argue against
imputing undue causal weight to the interests and consciously formulated strategies
of the actors involved, while we argue in favor of a relational analysis of how
Bstrategies without a strategist^ are formed and become coordinated in the course of
conducting parallel struggles in homologous fields. Our article is geared to demonstrate
the utility of historical comparison in pursuing and validating this explanatory ap-
proach. This approach provides a way to study connections among fields and the
emergence of policy-oriented expertise without overloading the causal significance
imputed to the strategic intentions and Bsocial constructions^ of the actors involved.
Through this demonstration, we aim to stimulate more research in this direction.
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